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Within tort law's last two decades, few subjects have bedeviled more 
commentators and animated more advocates than has the venerable institution of 
punitive damages.' Proponents of unfettered access to exemplary awards in instances 
of egregious misconduct assert that punitive damages are an essential incentive to 
important accident litigation. Their argument is that without access to such awards, or 
with availability limitedby a diverse array oflirnitations, injuredparties seekingjustice 
will face an imposing hurdle in securing counsel willing to subsidize the costs 
associated with bringing complex litigation. 
* Charles A. Freaueff Professor and Distinguished Professor of Law, Pace University School of 
Law. 
1. See general& RICHARD A. EpmM, TORTS 458 (1999). 
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Opponents of punitive damages, whose proposals range fiom damage caps or 
restrictive formulae to outright elimination, describe punitive damages as an unruly 
doctrinal foundling, capable of outrageous and wanton excess, and incapable of 
placement in any traditional tort structure. The distillate of such arguments is that 
unmediated punitive damages have no ad valolam effect in accident law, serve no 
progressive contemporary tort objective, preserve the specter of ungoverned 
overdeterrence, and "appear to be an anomaly, a hybrid in search of a rationale."* 
This Essay reviews the common law matrix in which punitive damages have been 
placed and the current availability of such awards in the several states. It continues by 
discussing the two most conspicuous doctrinal evaluative tools: (1) Corrective 
JusticelMorality; and (2) Economic Efficiency, examining the value of each of these 
in responding to avoidable and tortious harm. The Essay describes why neither 
corrective justice nor efficiency provides a satisfactory rationale for imposition of 
punitive damages. However, and perhaps ironically, these very limitations form part 
ofthe rationale for the availability of exemplary awards against actors whose conduct 
is extreme. 
This Essay then treats the United States Supreme Court's substantial andrepeated 
recent forays into the subject, including it's gloss on the DueProcess, ExcessiveFines, 
and Review Clauses. In conclusion, this Essay asserts that the independent but related 
state legislative and Supreme Court efforts to domesticate punitive damages have been 
largely successful in creating a favorable, albeit ungainly, fair, and rational position for 
punitive damages. 
11. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES, ACCIDENT LAW, AND TORT NORMS 
A. A Classical Treatment of Remedies for Accidental Injuries 
At early common law, an injury or loss having its immediate and uninterrupted 
cause attributable to the direct application of force by another could trigger an 
indemnificatory obligation in the actor. The earliest tort remedy for money reparations 
was made available to those suffering injury to their person or property caused by the 
actors' intentional (althoughnot criminally malicious) and direct application~fforce.~ 
As so many accidental injuries involved causal sequences in which temporal or other 
variables relegatedthe actor's conduct to amore remote, but still causally premier role, 
the orthodox trespass restriction operated to deny many worthy claimants of aremedy, 
while leaving an equivalent number ofwrongdoers undeterred fiom continuation ofthe 
2. Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice: Punitive Damages andlegal Pluralism, 42 AM. 
U. L. REV. 1393,1393 (1993). 
3. See generally C.H.S. FIFOOT, HISTORY AND SOURCES OF THE COMMON LAW: TORT AND 
Comc1'44 (1949). "Mayhem and battery were at first claimed as the ancestors of Trespass, but a 
later preference has been indicated for robbery, as suggestive both of trespass to the person and of 
trespass to goods." Id. (citations omitted). 
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risk-elevating conductPEnglish courts therefore createdleave to petition for aremedy 
termedUtrespass onthe special case," permitting an action-by-action evaluati~n.~ Thus, 
in actions inUspecial case," recovery was permitted to those injuredinmore elaborate 
causal sequences, such as when the actor's dereliction put into motion, or left 
uncorrected, a force or a circumstance that wouldlater cause the claimant harm or loss. 
The nomenclature "trespass on the special caseyy adequately described courts' 
amenability to examine the particular circumstances of a loss to determine if 
compensation was just. Put another way, as alarge proportion of such suits arose fiom 
scenarios in which the injury was occasioned by the actor's careless, rather than 
deliberate (thoughnotpurposefblly harmfbl) actions, actions inWspecial caseyy created 
aremedy inmonetary liability for the multitude of actions in which the injury arosenot 
by the actor's direct application of force, but rather by a sequence of causal factors. 
Courts limitedthis enlargement oftort liability by adding the requirement that save 
in limited circumstances,6 the plaintiffs prima facie case needed proof that the 
defendant not only causedthe injury, but that he was also in some degree at fault? This 
cause of action therefore accommodated a more nuanced causation proof, but at the 
same time, it elevated the plaintiffs burden by requiring a showing of fault. Thus, the 
standard developed was the direct precursor to negligence liability. 
The negligence regimen, with important sculpting in the products liability domain 
and elsewhere, has withstood time's test as alargely adequate set ofrules for ordering 
liability and risk reduction in the modem marketplace. As tort doctrine serves as a 
moral and cultural bellwether of social expectations, values, and objectives, the 
negligence rules governing or at least influencing accident law generally, and products 
liability in particular, have provided asturdy legal proxy for this nation's sentiment that 
reducing avoidable injuries inures to the public welfare. 
B. Remedies for More Aggravated Tortious Misconduct 
Early on, however, it was recognized that the law of neghgence was only capable 
ofresponding to "offthe shelf" examples of substandard conduct and consequent harm. 
Its optimal suitability was effectuating justice between the injured plaintiff and the 
negligent tortfeasor, by providing indemnification for the plaintiffs proved loss, and 
reinstating, insofar as money damages could do so, the plaintiff in the position he 
enjoyed prior to the harm. 
4. Commentators often noted the trespass doctrine's incapacity to provide a remedy for the 
accident in which the defendant, who was constructing a home along a road, accidentally left a beam 
of wood in the road, which hours later causedtheplaintiff s nocturnal carriage accident However, the 
"action on the case" cause of action allowed the court to examine such a situation to make an 
individualized determination of liability. 
5. Seegenerally F~OOT,supra note 4, at 66-92 (using the heading "The Development ofActions 
on the Case"). 
6 .  For example, liability for abnormally dangerous activities and defamation. 
7. Brovm v. Kendall, 60 Mass. (6 Cush.) 292 (1850); see ROBERT L. RABIN, PERSPECTIVES ON 
TORT LAW 14 n.2 (4th ed. 1995). 
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What, though, of particularly egregious conduct? Was a more draconian 
mechanism appropriate or necessary to respond to a defendant whose conduct 
exceeded ordinary ignorant or incautious carelessness, and could insteadbe described 
as wilfil, wanton, or evenpurposefid? Ought there not be apunishment (albeit civil) 
that was more severe for the actor whose conduct was more outrageous and willful than 
that of the actor whose tort might be nothing more than an unknowing mistake? 
The common law recognized that such aggravated misconduct warranted a more 
vigorous tort remedy for application by the civil justice system. Such a response, it 
followed, must necessarily go beyond ordinary indemnification and impose additional 
penalties that would serve to punish the actor, to make an example ofhim, and to more 
publicly pronounceeto others that such conduct was intolerable. 
Frederick Pollack noted that the nineteenth century "English lawyy typography of 
"Personal Wrongs," which included "[wlrongs affecting safety and ikeedom of the 
person," contemplated a type of wrong that was "willful or wanton."' According to 
Pollack, such a special or aggravated wrong was either "intended to do harm, or, being 
an act evidently likely to cause harm [and] is done with reckless indifference to what 
may befall by reason of it."9 In the context of intentional torts, Pollack's 
characterization hearkened ofthe same outrageousness that is noted today as sufficient 
to stimulate community outrage. Pollack concluded that such wrongs where "there is 
[either] deliberate injury, or there is something like the self-seeking indulgence of 
passion, in contempt of another man's rights and dignity," ought be considered not 
only "legal wrongs" but also wrongs that are properly "the subject of strong moral 
c~ndemnation."'~ 
The approach of justice administered with an eye towards such "public 
condemnation" is a primary tenet of the modem law ofpunitive damages, as embraced 
in one form or another in the majority of American jurisdictions. The laws of Great 
Britain, where punitive damages were founded, provides punitive damage awards for 
particular forms and qualities of risk-creating behavior. Civil Justice Rule 7 0 )  
provides: "Damages are essentially compensatory innature. In certain circumstances 
damages may not be compensatory." The commentary to the rule explains, in pertinent 
part: "Damages may be contemptuous, nominal, exemplary or (aggravated) punitive." 
In research collected by Professors Khan, Robson, and Smith,' ' one learns that British 
tribunals award "exemplary" damages "to teach the defendant a lesson," including 
circumstances in which "the defendant's conduct has been calculated by him to make 
a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation payable to the 
~laimant."'~ 
8. FREDERICK POLLACK, THELAW OF TORTS: A TREATISE ON THE PRINCIPLES OF OBLIGATIONS 
ARISING FROM CIVIL WRONGS IN THE COMMONLAW 9 (Stevens & Sons, Ltd., 2d ed. 1890). 
9. Id. In this regard, Pollack's classification was, concededly, confined to the intentional torts of 
"[a]ssault, battery, false imprisonment." Id. at 7. 
10. Id. at 9. He concludes in language explicit in its Greco Roman and Judeo-Christian affinities, 
"If anyone desires to be satisfied of this, he may open Homer or the Psalter at random." Id. 
1 1. MALCOLM KHAN ETAL., CLINICAL NEGLIGENCE (2d ed. 2002) 
12. Id. at 290-291. 
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Whether it is realistic to attribute to punitive damages success in achieving the 
goals of punishment, and deterrence, has been questioned by at least two arguments. 
First, punitive damages will not necessarily punish the wrongdoer, who will simply 
internalize the cost by raising the prices of its goods or services and pass them along 
to the consumer. Second, the insurer's duty to defend and duty to indemnify under the 
conventional Comprehensive General Liability Policy transfers both the cost of 
litigation and the responsibility to pay damages to the defendant's insurance carrier.I3 
As to the argument that the cost of any judgment will simply be passed along to 
the consumer, a Wisconsin appellate court explained that this attempt at expediency 
would not be invariably available to the defendant in a vehicular design lawsuit: 
It does not follow under economic logic that a punitive damage 
award will be passed on in whole or in part as a cost of doing 
business. It may or may not, depending upon Ford's price standing 
inrelationto its competitors andits own financial condition. It could 
meanlower profits for Ford It couldresult in stockholder complaints 
about a lowerprofit margin because ofpunitive damage awards for 
unsafe cars, thereby spurring Ford on to exercise more care in the 
safe design of its automobiles. It could result in a greater scrutiny by 
Ford's management ofits auto design fromthe safety standpoint. All 
ofthese changes, with the exception of lowerprofits or higher costs, 
ifthey were to take place, would benefit the public as a whole.14 
Regarding the second potential that insurance would vitiate any punitive impact of 
such a\vards, many states provide that insurance against punitive damages is void as 
inconsistent with public p~licy. '~ 
A. Generally 
Skepticism about the value, governability, or both of exemplary damages has 
been debated among academicians since the nineteenth century.16 Some 
commentators focused on the perceived incongruity between the exemplary damage 
13. Thisnomenclaturedoesnotdistorttherecognitionthatpunitivedamages arenotrectificatory 
orindemnificatory, as suchgoals aresatisfiedthroughthe awardof compensatory damages. Rather, the 
indemnification described here, should itbe available, is the insurance canier's duty to indemnify the 
insured for the payment of anyjudgement, even though, in the ordinary course of such transactions, it 
is not the actor that satisfies the judgment to the successfbl plaintiff, but rather the canier. 
14. Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294N.W.2d437,452 (Wis. 1980) (quoting from Judge Barland 
in Barager v. Ford Motor Co., 293 N.W.2d 924 (Wis. 1980)). 
15. See, e.g.,NorthwesternNat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty, 307F.2d432,442 (5thCir. 1962) (finding 
that 'public policy forbids an insurer and an insured to enter into an insurance contract covering 
punitive damages"); see generally DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: 
DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION 336 n.6 (2d ed. 1993) (collecting authority). 
16. mohm H. KOENIG &MICHAEL L. RUSTAD, IN DEFENSE OF TORTS LAW 41 (200 1). 
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penalty as inconsistent with tort law's compensatory goal, even going so far as to 
suggest that punitive damage awards should escheat to the state." 
In our modem setting, the final verdict on the value ofpunitive damages certainly 
must be interpreted through the societal expectations ofpersonal integrity and general 
welfare as expressed through the law of torts. Over time, accident law has developed 
distinctive liability doctrines with the dual objectives of deterring risk-elevating 
behavior and encouraging more societally beneficial conduct. In pursuing these 
objectives, the Corrective JusticeIMorality (Corrective Justice)18 approach and the 
Law and Economics~Economic Efficiency (Economic Efficiency)lg approaches have 
dramatically affected legal education and scholarship as well as the common law and 
statutory development of the law governing money damages for accidental injuries. 
B. Corrective JusticdMorality 
The older of the two principal approaches is commonly termed Corrective 
Justice, and its influential group of scholars hew to the position that the on& and 
still primary goal of tort law, including the law of products liability, is righting 
wrongs caused by tortious behavior. With its strong overlay of moral obligation, and 
the annulment of a wrongdoer's unjust enrichment, the Corrective Justice approach 
posits that tort law's principal raison d 'itre is to return parties suffering physical 
injury or property damage due to another's tortious conduct to the status quo ante, at 
least insofar as money damages can so d~.'~Notwithstanding the occasional argument 
of the Economic Efficiency supporters which herald that efficiency precepts explain 
most purely the deterrence effects of tort liability rules, a corollary to the Corrective 
Justice thesis has always been that in addition to its rectificatory goal, the Corrective 
Justice model also advances the societal objective of reducing the occurrence of 
17. Id. 
18. See generally Robert E. Litan et al., The US. Liability System: Background and Trends, in 
LIABILITY: PERSPECTIVES AND POLICY 1 (Robert E. Litan & Clifford Winston eds. 1988). 
Injuries pose three different and potentially conflicting challenges for all societies. 
One is efficiently to deter behavior that causes injuries. A second and related 
objective is to exactretribution against thoseresponsible.. . .The third challenge 
is to compensate victims for their injuries. . . . Tort la+mles allowing accident 
victims to seek compensation through the judicial system from the parties 
responsible-can be considered a mechanism for meeting all three of these 
challenges. 
Id. at 3.  
19. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (3d ed. 1986). 
20. Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed. 1995). "[Clorrective justice is the principle that those who are 
responsible for the wrongful losses of others have a duty to repair them, and that the core of tort law 
embodiesthis conceptionofcorrectivejustice."Id.;see Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of TortLaw: 
Afirming Both Deterrence and Corrective Justice, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1801 (1997). "Currently there are 
two major camps of tort scholars. One understands tort liability as an instrument aimed largely at the 
goal of deterrence, commonly explained within the frameworkofeconomics. Theother looks at tort law 
as a way of achieving corrective justice between the parties." Id. 
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similar wrongs in the future?' 
C. Economic Eflciency 
The more recently developed approach is one of Economic Efficiency, an 
evaluation that seeks to demonstrate that the appropriate measure of the success or 
failure of any law, including tort law, ought to proceed under an economic analysis. 
Ordinary economic rationales have also described the role of compensatory damages 
as an effective means of discouraging substandard or risk-creating conduct injuring 
an unconsenting third party and thus bypassing the market. It is better, theoretically 
at least, to pressure the actor into bargaining with any willing and knowing person for 
the right to expose him to a riskU 
The conspicuous deterrence objective ofpunitive damages is seemingly endorsed 
by the Restatement (Second) of Torts' standard that exemplary damages should be 
"awarded against a person to punish him for his outrageous conduct and to deter him 
and others like him fiom similar conduct in the futue."" The deterrence objective 
ofpunitive damages is so strong that some authority exists for the appropriateness of 
awards even when the actor has died, on the theory that even in the absence of a 
punishment dedicated to a living person, such an award is warranted in that it will 
deter other similarly situated living actors from pursuing the same course of conduct. 
It plausibly can be arguedthat the availability ofpunitive damages is anecessary, 
but not by itself sufEcient, component to discourage wanton harmful conduct. As to 
the arguable necessity of such damages in some form, there is a continued value for 
punitive damages, be they in mediated or unrnediated form. Put another way, the 
imposition of conventional Corrective Justice measures, resulting upon proper proof 
in the compensation of the plaintiff for his proved loss, will concededly instill some 
hesitance in the actor to perpetuate the same conduct again. However, the majority 
of states continue to conclude that more than simple compensatory damages is 
necessary to discourage misbehavior at its extreme. Thus, for example, in the 
influential decision handed down by the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Wangen v. 
21. The corrective justice objective of deterrence is evidenced in scholarly writings dating back 
to thenineteenthcentury. In 1890, one academic authorwrote aboutthegoals ofthenegligence action: 
"Thereally importantmatter is to adjust the disputebetweentheparties by amleof conductwhichshall 
do justice if possible in the particular case, but which shall also be suitable to the needs of the 
community, and tend to prevent like accidents from happening in [the] future." William Schofield, 
Davies v. M a w  Theory of ContributoryNegligence, 3 HARV.L.REV. 263,269 (1890); accordBarrett 
v. Superior Court, 272 Cal. Rptr. 304,308 (Ct. App. 1990). The Barrett court commented further that 
by choosing not to limit the measure of damages, "California has chosen 'to strengthen the deterrent 
aspect of the civil sanction: "the sting of unlimited recovery . . . more effectively penalize[s] the 
culpable defendant and deter[s] it and others similarly situated fiom such future conduct"' . . . rather 
than to protect defendants from excessive financial burdens." Id. at 308 (alterationin original) (citations 
omitted); see also Pierce v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 212 Cal. Rptr. 283,291 (Ct. App. 1985) (stating one 
principal purpose of strict liability was "to provide an economic incentive for improved product 
safety"). 
22. Today one cannot help but think of the newest "trash" TV shows "Fear Factor" and "The 
Chair" and derivatives thereof. 
23. RESTATE~~ENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 8 908 (1979). 
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FordMotor CO. ,~~  Fordargued that the magnitude ofpotential compensatory damages 
in a serious injury case was itself sufficient incentive to the bringing of lawsuits to 
redress injuries.'' The court responded that Ford was only partly correct and that 
punitive damages were a necessary gear in the machinery of tort law incentives for 
a large number of actions that might not otherwise be filed.26 The court wrote that 
"Ford may be right [that the prospect of significant compensatory damages will 
provide sufficient incentive for the bringing of claims] where injuries are very severe, 
but it is probably wrong . . . where injuries are moderate or minor."27 The court 
buttressed its conclusion that punitive damages may be appropriate in such latter 
instances by proposing that "even if the injury to each individual is not severe, there 
is a public need to deter the production of unreasonably [unlsafe products, and the 
availability ofpunitive damages increases the likelihood that the injured customer will 
sue for recovery."28 
It is difficult to maintain that simple responsibility in indemnification sends a 
strong message to others similarly situated to discontinue such egregious conduct, 
particularly in circumstances in which the actual penalty may be incurred not by the 
actor, but rather by its insurance carrier. Additionally, simple compensatory awards 
fail to satisfy the long recognized, if not uniformly respected, community wish to 
make an example of those whose conduct has gone beyond simple carelessness into 
the realm of wantonness and its fellow traveler, immorality. 
Additionally, while the Economic Efficiency model for tort liability may provide 
an adequate rationale for compensatory damages, its inherent limitations point to the 
need for the extraordinary remedy of punitive damages. The Economic Efficiency 
approach to explaining ordinary compensatory damage awards has been illustrated 
by Judge Posner, enlisting the law of battery-the common law rule concerning 
liability for harmful or offensive touching. Quite apart fiom the Corrective Justice, 
morality, and fairness attributes of tort law for battery, the law and economics 
argument is that the doctrine should "dete[r] persons fiorn engaging in activities that 
a reasonable person would view ahead of time to be socially ~asteful.'"~ Posner 
illustrates this proposition with the decision in Garratt v. Daile~.~' Garratt is 
remembered as the case in which the five-year-old Dailey pulled away the lawn chair 
as his, until that point, affectionate aunt was in the process of sitting down.31 
Proponents of the Economic Efficiency model would argue that tort liability in battery 
would serve the efficiency objective, irrespective of whether Dailey received any 
psychological or material benefit from the act. If the harm to his aunt exceeded any 
benefits to Dailey, a simple utilitarian analysis would support the imposition of 
24. 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980). 
25. Id. at 441 
26. Id. at 448. 
27. Id. at 452. 
28. Id. at 452-53. 
29. See JAMES A. HENDERON, JR. ET AL., THE TORTS PROCESS 29 (4th ed. 1994) (discussing 
P o s N E R , ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  note 19, at 206-1 1. 
30. 279 P.2d 109 1 (Wash. 1955). 
31. Id. at 1092. 
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liability. On the other hand, if Dailey derived benefits that exceeded any physical or 
emotional injury to his aunt, pulling the chair out was wasteful or inefficient. Why 
wasteful? Because the transaction-the act and the harm-without the aunt's consent 
could generate sizeable accident costs, not the least of the costs being substantial 
litigation costs. In Posner's words, such torts 
involve. . . a coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant in a setting 
of low transaction costs. Such conduct is inefficient because it 
violates the principle that where market transaction costs are low, 
people should be required to use the market ifthey can and to desist 
fiom the conduct ifthey can't?* 
Thus, in this simplifiedparadigm of the application of the efficiency model to the 
classic tort of battery, plainti£'s loss serves as a proxy for the calculation of what 
waste or avoidable accident costs the defendant's inefficient conduct has occasioned. 
However, the mere description of the efficiency rationale betrays its incapacity to 
satisfactorily deal with risk-creating behavior of the most extreme type. An award of 
compensatory damages, be it thought of in t e r n  of simple Corrective Justice or as 
a proxy for accident costs incurred by the defendant's inefficient behavior, meets its 
limitation in settings involving extreme conduct characteristic of punitive damages. 
Economic Efficiency proponents assert that the actor is properly punished for failing 
to resort to the market to seek contractual authorization for his conduct. However, the 
existence of a market for such agreement predicates this assumption. Persons do, of 
course, bargain away degrees of safety-witness the popularity ofthrill rides at theme 
parks and the accompanying purported waivers of liability. Yet, in the context of 
willful, wanton, or deliierate risk-creating behavior, which often translates into injury, 
severe or othenvise, to many persons, one is unlikely to find any lucid person or 
group of persons prepared to bargain away their relative safety. 
N. MODERN LEG IS LA^ CONTROL AND CONSTITUTIONAL SUPERVISION 
A. Generally 
Modem legislative reform has taken several approaches. To name only a few, 
many jurisdictions require that punitive damages may be awarded only on proof by 
"clear and convincing evidence'' of the defal~ation.3~ Three states allow the jury to 
determine the availability of punitive damages, but place the decision as to the 
amount of the award in the hands of the c0urt.3~ Other initiatives to limit jury 
32. POSNER, supra note 19, at 208. 
33. See, eg., ~&w.STAT.ANN. 5 549.20(1)(a) (West2000) (applying the "clear and convincing" 
standard). The several variations of state law reform are summarized a t E ~ s ~ ~ ~ ~ , s u p r a  note 1, at464- 
65. 
34. CONN.GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 52-240b (West 1991); KAN.STAT.ANN. 5 60-3701(a) (1991); OHIO 
REV. CODE. ANN. 5 2307.80@3) (Anderson 200 1); see generally DAVID G. OWEN, M. STUARTMADDEN 
& MARY J. DAVIS, 2 ADDEN EN & O i m  ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY 4 18:6 (3d ed. 2000) [hereinafter 
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discretion in punitive damages decisions include confining such awards to multiples 
of the compensatory damages awarded.35 
To moderate the phenomenon of punitive damages, a remarkably interested 
Supreme Court has accepted the invitation to examine state punitive damages law 
under the lenses of the Due Process, the Excessive Fines, and theNo Review Clauses. 
B. The Supreme Court's Intervention 
In three influential decisions between 1991 and 1996 the Supreme Court 
answered important questions about the Fourteenth Amendment's substantive due 
process limitations on the prerogatives of state courtjuries to award punitive damages. 
In these three decisions, PaciJic Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Ha~lip:~ IXO 
Productions Cop. v. Alliance Resources C~rp . :~  and BMWof North America, Inc. 
v. Gore.:' the Court established that neither the Due Process Clause nor the Eighth 
Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause would be violated if exemplary awards were 
imposed pursuant to reasonably intelligible jury instructions, upheld on the basis of 
rational standards, and were not "clearly excessive." 
In Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatheman Tool Group, Inc.:' the Court, in the 
context of its three prior holdings, squared the box by establishing the standard for 
federal appellate courts reviewing punitive awards.40 The Cooper Court held that a 
combination of due process, jury function, and trial and appellate court expertise 
considerations commended de novo review of jury punitive damage j~dgements.~~ 
Although both the majority42 and the dissenting43 opinions conceded that the issue 
might have more philosophical effect than practical consequence, members of the 
defense and the plaintiffs' bar have suggested that the decision exhibits the Court's 
pro-business orientation. Regardless, Cooper stands as a marvelous tutorial in the role 
of punitive damage awards in American civil litigati~n.~~ 
The Supreme Court has visited core punitive damage issues with a devotion 
accorded few other constitutional issues, and with an emphasis, at least prior to 
Cooper, upon substantive due process limitations that should be imposed upon jury 
MADDEN & OWEN ON PRODUCTS LIABILITY] (discussing legislative reform pertaining to punitive 
damages). 
35. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 13-21-102(1)(a) (West 1997) (stating punitive damages 
may not exceed compensatory damages); see ako  MADDEN& OWENONPRODUCISLIABIL~, supra 
note 36, $18:6, at308 (listing states withstatutory cap onpunitivedamages such as Comecticut,North 
Dakota and Texas (two times compensatory damages); Florida and Nevada (three times); Maryland 
legislative proposal (four times); and New Jersey (greater of five times or $350,000)). 
36. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
37. 509 U.S. 443 (1993) (plurality opinion). 
38. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
39. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
40. Id. at 443. 
41. Id. at 437-40. 
42. Id. at 441. 
43. Id. at 448 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
44. There is much evidence that the bark of potential punitive damage liability is greater than its 
bite, but that examination is beyond present purposes. 
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discretion in such awards. In the first of the three most important of these decisions, 
PaciJic Muhcal Life Insurance Co. v. Ha~lip:~ the Court desaiied such awards as 
performing a "quasi-criminal"46 function intended as "private fines"47 that would 
punish the defendant and deter future lvrongfhl c~nduct.~' In Haslip, the Court 
considered an Alabama jury's punitive damages award of $800,000 that had been 
rendered against an insurance agent and his employer for the agent's fraud in 
collecting and keeping insurance premiums even after the plaintiffs' policies hadbeen 
cancelled49 The award was approximately four times the plainti&' proved loss?O 
Examining the award against the backdrop of Alabama jury instructions, and in view 
of that state's established standards for appellate review of exemplary awards, the 
Court stated that while the award might be "close to the [constitutional] line," it was 
not so large as to violate due process?' The Court paid particular attention to that 
jurisdiction's three levels of procedural safeguards: jury instructions, post-verdict 
review by the trial court, and appellate revie~v?~ The jury's instructions afforded 
"significanf' but not "unlimited" discretion, in that they set forth the purposes for 
such awards-deterrence and punishments3 Similarly, the Court found the post- 
verdict review procedure sufficient because trial courts were required "to reflect in the 
record the reasons for interfering with the a jury verdict, or refusing to do so, on 
grounds of excessiveness of the  damage^."'^ Finally, it considered the appellate 
review which, pursuant to decisions of the Alabama Supreme Court, required 
consideration of numerous factors relating to the relationship between the 
compensatory and the punitive awards, the reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct, the profitability of the conduct, and the defendant's h c i a l  position." 
In TXO Productions Corp. v. Alliance Resources the Court &ed a 
$10 million punitive damages award following trial of a dispute over oil and gas 
development rights in West Virgi~ia.'~ IIXO had sought a declaratory judgment 
regarding the rights, following which Allied brought a counterclaim for slander of 
title?' Finding in favor ofAlliance, the jury had awarded $19,000 in actual  damage^.'^ 
Applying a '&ossly excessive" standard, the Court took particular note of TXO's 
misconduct, and wrote: 
45. 499 U.S. 1 (1991). 
46. Id. at 19. 
47. Id. at 47 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,350 
(1974)). 
48. Id. at 19. 
49. Id. at 47 .  
50. Hmlip, 499 U.S. at 23. 
51. Id. at 23-24. 
52. Id. at 19-23. 
53. Id. at 19. 
54. Id. at 20. 
55. Id. at 20-22. 
56. 509 U.S. 443 (1993). 
57. Id. at 443. 
58. Id. at 447. 
59. Id. at 451. 
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[We] do not consider the dramatic disparity between actual 
damages and the punitive award controlling in a case of this 
character. On this record, the jury may reasonably have determined 
that petitioner set out on a malicious and hudulent course to win 
back, either in whole or in part, the lucrative stream of royalties that 
it had ceded to Alliance. The punitive damages in this case [are] 
certainly large, but in light of the money potentially at stake, the 
bad faith of [TXO], the fact that the scheme employed in this case 
was part of a larger pattern of h u d ,  trickery and deceit, and 
petitioner's wealth, we are not persuaded that the award was so 
"grossly excessive" as to be beyond the power of the states to 
allow.60 
BMWof North America, Inc. v. Gore:' evolved fiom plaintiffs damage action 
which he brought upon learning that his vehicle, purchased as "new," had actually 
been partially repainted after being damaged in transit by acid rain6' The jury 
awarded him $4,000 in compensatory damages, and $4 millionin punitive damages!3 
The Alabama Supreme Court reduced the punitive award to $2 million.64 The United 
States Supreme Court began its analysis by acknowledging that a state may employ 
punitive damages to punish and deter miscond~ct!~ Then, reiterating a "grossly 
excessive" standard of review, the Court continued: "Only when an award can fairly 
be categorized as 'grossly excessive' in relation to these interests does it enter the 
zone of arbitrariness that violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment."66 The Court held that a principal flaw in the Gore verdict was that the 
evidence admitted and considered by the jury had included each of the approximately 
1000 instances in which BMW had sold such similarly repaired vehicles nationwide, 
including sales in states @ which such sales violated no consumer protection laws.67 
The reach of the verdict contemplated the erroneously-perceived interests of other 
states, potentially violating interstate comity that could "infiing[e] on the policy 
choices of other  state^."^' Thus, the Supreme Court found that when only Alabama's 
punishment and deterrence interests were taken into account, the $2 million award 
was "clearly exce~sive."~~ The Gore Court continued by i d e n m g  three guideposts 
for determining if a punitive award was ccgrossly excessive": (1) the degree of 
reprehensibility of the defendant's misconduct, (2) the reasonableness of the 
relationship (the "ratio") of the punitive award to the compensatory award, and (3) a 
60. Id. at 462. 
61. 517 U.S. 559 (1996). 
62. Id. at 563. 
63. Id. at 565. 
64. Id. at 567. 
65. Id. at 568. 
66. Id. at 568 (citing TXO Prods. Gorp., 509 U.S. at 456). 
67. Gore, 517 U.S. at 570-72. 
68. Id. at 572. 
69. Id. at 574. 
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comparison with the other civil and criminal penalties imposed or authorized in such 
cases?' 
Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Leatheman Tool Group., Inc?l involved two 
manufacturers of multifhction hand tools, both seeking to improve the venerable 
Swiss army Leatherman's tool enjoyed the dominant market position at the 
time Cooper undertook to introduce its new product.73 In the course of promoting its 
new product, but before commencing its actual production and sale, Cooper used in 
its advertising materials photographs of a modification of the Leatherman pr0duct.7~ 
Leatherman filed trade-dress infringement, unfair competition, and false advertising 
claims under the Lanham and common law claims of unfair c~mpetition?~ The 
jury awarded $50,000 in actual damages and entered a $4.5 million punitive damage 
verdict as well?7 The trial court rejected Cooper's post-trial claims that the punitive 
damage award was "grossly exce~sive,"~~ and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
a&med the punitive damages award, finding that the trial court hadnot "abuse[d] its 
discretion in declining to reduce the amo~nt.'"~ 
The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the single issue ofwhether the appellate 
court's application of an "abuse of discretion" standard in its review was proper, as 
contrasted with review on a de novo basis?' Reversing and remanding, the Court held 
that in matters of appellate review of punitive damage awards, federal appeals courts 
should employ de novo review?' In so doing, the Court principally focused on three 
considerations: (1) the departure ofpunitive damage awards fiom ordinary "findings 
of fact" associated with awards of compensatory damages; (2) the respective 
capacities of the trial and appellate courts to apply the indicia established in BMW of 
North America, Inc. v. Gore.;82 and (3) the virtues of appellate court de novo review 
in the achievement of a semblance of uniformity and predictability in allowable 
exemplary damage a ~ ~ a r d s ? ~  
70. Id. at 574-75; see generally 2 MADDEN & O ~ N  ON PRODUC~S LIABILITY, supra note 36, 
5 18:7, at324-25 (using Gore as aprimary example for instructing courts on how to use due process to 
strike down excessive punitive damages awards). 
71. 532 U.S. 424 (2001). 
72. Id. at 427. 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. 15 U.S.C. 5 1125(a) (1994 & Supp. V 1999). 
76. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 428. 
77. Id. at 429. 
78. Id. 
79. Id. at43 1 (quoting Cooperhdus., Inc. v. LeathermanTool Group, hc.,No. CV-96-1346-MA, 
1999 IVL 1216844, at **2 (9th Cir. Dec. 17, 1999)). 
80. Id. 
81. Id. 
82. 517 U.S. 559 (1996); see supra note 70 and accompanying text. 
83. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 431-42. 
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I .  Exemplary Awards Dzfer From Compensatory Damage Findings of 
Fact 
The Seventh Amendment's Re-examination Clause "controls the allocation of 
authority to review verdicts"84 and provides that "no fact tried by jury, shall be 
otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules 
of the common law."8s It has been accepted generally that the Re-examination Clause 
is not violated by appellate review applying a deferential "clearly erroneous" 
standard." Central to the Court's analysis in Cooper was its conclusion that punitive 
damage awards differ fkom ordinary jury findings of fact, and therefore may be 
subject to appellate review without the constraints of the Re-examination Clause.'' In 
the Court's words, "[u]nlike the measure of actual damages suffered, which presents 
a question of historical or predictive fact, . . . the level of punitive damages is not 
really a 'fact' 'tried' by the jury."" Rather, in the Court's view, awards of exemplary 
damages are "expression[s] of . . . moral condemnationy7 intended to "punish 
reprehensible conduct and to deter its future oc~urrence."'~ 
2. Respective Trial and Appellate Court Capacity 
While the "Jury Trial" and Re-examination Clauses make essential obeisances 
to the trial court's superior position in evaluating what proof is to be admitted into 
evidence and whether sufficient support exists for conventional findings of fact, the 
Court's conclusion that awards of exemplary damages do not constitute conventional 
findings of fact invited it to consider which vantage point-that of the trial court or 
that of the appellate court-was superior for application of the Gore factors. If the 
appeals courts were better able to apply the Gore factors, such a conclusion would 
bolster the argument that the "clearly erroneous" standard of review would be less 
warranted, and hence more support for de novo review by the appeals court. 
Taking the Gore factors seriatim, the Court conceded that as to the first Gore 
factor requiring consideration of the degree of reprehensibility of the defendant's 
conduct, the trial courts "have a somewhat superior vantage over courts of appeals," 
but added "that the advantage exists primarily with respect to issues turning on 
witness credibility and demeanor."g0 
As to the second Gore factor, relating to "the disparity between the harm (or 
potential harm) suffered by the plaintiff and the punitive damage award," the Court 
84. Gasperini v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415,432 (1996). 
85. U.S. CONST. amend. VII. 
86. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 437-40. 
87. Id. 
88. Id. at 437 (quoting Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 459 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citation omitted)). 
89. Id. at 432 (citations omitted). 
90. Id. at440. Contrasttheevaluation ofJustice Ginsberg, who states thatregarding the first Gore 
in dictum the trial courts "have anundeniably superior vantage over courts of appeal" inevaluating the 
first criterion, that ofthe reprehensibility of the defendant's conduct, insofar as the trial court views the 
evidence not as reflected in a "cold paper record" but rather "in the living courtroom context." Id. at 
445,448 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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determined that "[tlrial courts and appellate courts seem equally capable of analyzing 
the second factor.'*' Lastly, the third factor's call for consideration of "the difference 
between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties authorized 
or imposed in comparable cases" called, in the Court's view, "for a broad legal 
comparison . . . more suited to the expertise of appellate courts."92 Taken in the 
aggregate, the majority concluded that "[c]onsiderations of institutional competence 
therefore fail to tip the balance in favor of [the] deferential [clearly erroneous standard 
of) revie~v."~~ 
3. The Value of Uniformity and Predictability 
The Court also highlighted the objectives of bringing uniformity and 
predictability to review of exemplary damage awards. It stated that "[ilndependent 
review is therefore necessary if appellate courts are to maintain control of, and to 
clanfy, the legal  principle^."^^ Quoting Justice Breyer's concurrence in Gore, the 
Court emphasized that "[rlequiring the application of law, rather than a 
decisionmaker's caprice, does more than simply provide citizens notice of what 
actions might subject them to punishment; it also helps to assure the uniform 
treatment of similarly situated persons that is the essence of law 
4. Justice Ginsberg 3 Dissent 
The gravamen of Mrs. Justice Ginsberg's dissent was that the majority erred in 
finding that awards of punitive damages were not "findings of fact" within the reach 
of the Re-examination Clause. Adopting the majority's language that a telling 
characteristic of findings of fact is their character as "historical or predictive fact," 
Justice Ginsberg conceded that exemplary awards involved a panoply of 
considerati~ns?~ However, she continued by urging that while punitive awards 
differed fiom compensatory awards in the cluster of considerations that make up the 
jury verdict, the difference was a matter of degree and not of kindg7 "[Tlhere can be 
no question that a jury's verdict on punitive damages is fundamentally dependent on 
determinations we characterize as factfindings," she wrote, using as examples "the 
extent of harm or potential harm caused by the defendant's misconduct, whether the 
defendant acted in good faith' whether the misconduct was an individual instance or 
part of abroaderpattem, [and] whether the defendant behavednegligently, recklessly, 
or mali~iously."~~ Justice Ginsburg assertedthat the inexact relationbetween an award 
of punitive damages and a compensatory damage award should not vitiate the 
91. Id. at 441. 
92. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 441. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 436. 
95. Id. (quoting Gore, 517 U.S. at 587 (Breyer, J., concurring)). 
96. Id. at 446 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting). 
97. Id. 
98. Cooper Indus., Inc., 532 U.S. at 446. 
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underlying reality that each is tethered to jury findings of fact. Using noneconomic 
damages (usually pain and suffering) as a basis for comparison, Justice Ginsberg 
suggested that "[olne million dollars' worth of pain and suffering does not exist as a 
'fact' in the world any more or less than one million dollars' worth of moral outrage. 
Both derive their meaning from a set of underlying facts as determined by a jury. If 
one set of quantification is properly regarded as factfinding, it seems to me that the 
other should be so regarded as well."99 
5. What Will Be The Impact of Cooper? 
In anticipatory humility, the Cooper majority concurred with the dissent in 
admitting that the redefined appellate role of de novo review "will affect the result of 
the Gore analysis in only a relatively small number of cases[,]"100 and thus there is 
reason to surmise that the impact of Cooper will not materially change the quantity 
of punitive damage awards handed down by juries, nor the quantum of the individual 
awards. Federal trial court judges now have years of experience in applying the Gore 
factors, and there has been no indication that they have failed to execute the Supreme 
Court's charge in that decision as faithfully as they must any other instruction from 
the Court, including the gratuitously minimized trial court capacity to evaluate "the 
difference between the punitive damages awarded by the jury and the civil penalties 
authorized or imposed in comparable cases.'y101 
It is delicious, nonetheless, to speculate whether the trial bar will develop special 
interrogatories for jurors in exemplary award cases in an effort to provide a fact-based 
underpinning that could move a court to conclude that the award of exemplary 
damages was indeed a conclusion based upon "historic or predictive fact," and thus 
akin to conventional compensatory damage awards suited to "clearly erroneous," 
rather than de novo, review. 
An irony of punitive damages is that the tort remedy intended as a prophylaxis 
for conduct so aggravated as to require extraordinary, noncompensatory measures for 
its containment will itself continue to prompt vigorous state and constitutional law 
restraints-a modem genie in the bottle. While abolishing punitive damages 
altogether remains an option to state legislatures, most states will almost certainly 
continue to preserve exemplary awards for truly outrageous conduct as a necessary 
instrument in correcting the under-deterrence of ordinary compensatory damages. At 
the same time, states can be expected to experiment with various f o b  of limitations, 
or develop new ones, to ameliorate the claimed overdeterrence risks of broad jury 
discretion in the entry of such awards. 
99. Id. (citations omitted). 
100. 121 S. Ct. at 1688. 
101. Id. at440. 
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The Due Process and Excessive Fines Clauses importantly h e  the boundaries 
ofpermissible awards in terms that hearken to conventional fairness goals of remedies 
for avoidable accidents. The Haslip, TXO, Gore, and Cooper decisions establish the 
Supreme Court's position that while constitutionally lawhl, important substantive 
restrictions and mechanisms for the consistent application of those restrictions are 
necessary dimensions of the continued application of exemplary awards. In essence, 
the Supreme Court has imposed a constitutional requirement that punitive damage 
awards wil l  only pass constitutional muster after successful passage through several 
fairness checkpoints. 
In tort law's lengthy development of governing liability for causing injurious and 
avoidable accidents, it has been a truism that common law causes of actions and 
remedies have developed by accretion, with new remedies or limitations advanced 
upon the presentation of new facts, developing societal expectations, or both. At the 
same time, state legislatures have not balked at the task of sculpting or placing 
limitations upon such judicially-created remedies. In no area of tort law is the 
influence of state legislative and United States constitutional collaboration more 
focused than in the law of exemplary damages. In a petrie dish in which the these 
creative and restrictive agents alike have been introduced, each mod@mg, retarding, 
or enhancing the other, will be witnessed the continuing evolution of our modem law 
of punitive damages. 
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